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Poverty is a serious problem in many countries around the world. Many governments have
adopted welfare benefits programs as a tool to reduce poverty. In recent years, however,
there has been growing interest in basic income as a new instrument for poverty reduction.
The basic income system was proposed by Atkinson (1996) and is expected to solve the
disadvantages of welfare benefits programs that include high costs to the government and
the poor associated with the means test, the complexity of the system, and stigma.
Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) present a model of screening in welfare benefits programs. In
their model, an optimal welfare system is proposed based on the trade-off between targeting
efficiency and incomplete take-up by raising screening intensity. Many economists have con-
sidered the effects of welfare programs on labor supply. Moffitt (2002) presents a review of
empirical and theoretical researches on the effect of welfare systems on labor supply.
Ghatak and Maniquet (2019) present theoretical aspects of the basic income system,
particularly, they explain the desirability and feasibility of basic income. Cremer and Roeder
(2015) present the political economy model in which welfare benefits programs means testing
or basic income system is adopted by voting.
In this paper, I present a comparative institutional analysis of the welfare and basic
income systems. I find that, when the level of basic income is high, basic income yields lower
social welfare than welfare benefits programs. The total labor supply under the basic income
system is larger than that under welfare benefits programs when the welfare benefits level is
lower than the critical level.
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows: Section 2 explains the basic setting of
the model; Section 3 analyzes the players’ behavior under the basic income system; Section
4 analyzes the players’ behavior under the welfare benefits system; Section 5 conducts a
comparative institutional analysis, and the final section contains my conclusions.
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2 Model
The basic setting follows Besley and Coate (1992) and Kurita et al. (2020). There is an
economy with a finite player set I. The population is divided into two classes: poor and rich.
The proportion of the poor class in the total population is β ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, the poor
class is split into needy and non-needy types. The proportion of the needy type in the poor
class is γ ∈ (0, 1). To make the notation easier to read, we describe the needy poor as type
1, the non-needy poor as type 2, and the rich as type 3.
Following Besley and Coate (1992), I assume that the needy poor individuals cannot work
while the non-needy poor can work and earn work income ω. Formally, the non-needy-poor
players have two actions ai ∈ {W,N}, where W corresponds to working and N corresponds
to not working, i ∈ I2, I2 is the set of non-needy poor players, and I2 ⊂ I. If non-needy-poor
players choose to work, they suffer from labor disutility θ, and θ is uniformly distributed in
Θ ∈ [0, 1]. For simplicity, the size of the total population is assumed to be 1.
The rich class has the following utility:
U3 = u(c3), (1)
c3 = y − t, (2)
where u(·) is the well-behaved concave utility function from consumption, y is the income for
the rich, and t is the head tax, which is determined by the government budget constraint.
The preference for the poor class is as follows:
3 Basic income system
The model compares the Basic Income institution with the welfare benefit institution. Let
BI and WB denote the basic income with welfare benefit . Under BI, all players receive
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basic income B, and the government budget constraint is given by
(1− β)t = B. (3)
In (3), the left-hand side is the tax revenue, and the right-hand side is the total cost for BI.





The utilities for the needy poor and the rich are given as follows:
U1 = u(B), (5)
U3 = u(y +B − tBI), (6)
Here, by the government budget constraint (3), the net income for the rich class is given by:




That is, the basic income system reduces income for the rich, and the result is natural.







u(ω +B)− θ if ai∈I2 = W,,
u(B) if ai∈I2 = N,
(8)
Non-needy poor players make decisions under a trade-off between increasing income by work-
ing with labor disutility and giving-up working income without disutility. We define the
critical level of θ as follows:
u(ω +B)− θ̂BI = u(B), (9)
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Equation (9) indicates that the non-needy poor-type players with θ ≥ θ̂BI prefer not to work
and the others prefer to work. For notation simplicity, let θ− and θ+ denote θ < θ̂ and θ ≥ θ̂.
Equilibrium outcomes are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1 In the equilibrium under BI, the following outcomes realize:
total labor supply is given by
L∗
BI
= βγ[u(ω +B)− u(B)],
The utility of the needy type player is given by
U∗1,BI = u (B) ,
the utility of the non-needy type player with θ− is given by
U∗2,BI,W = u(ω +B)− θ,
the utility of the non-needy type player with θ+ is given by
U∗2,BI,N = u(B), (10)









Proposition 1 shows the straightforward results. Because basic income is a very simple and
universal scheme, the effect of a change in the level of basic income on equilibrium is intuitive.
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4 Welfare benefit system
Next, I analyze the welfare benefits system WB. Under WB, players need to claim taking-up
welfare if they hope to obtain welfare. For simplicity, all claimers in poor class players can
take up welfare, following Besley and Coate (1992). The actions for non-needy-type players
must be reconsidered: working without welfare or taking up welfare without working. Let
W and N denote the former and latter, respectively. Furthermore, needy-type players have
choices: taking up welfare (T ) or not NT .







u(ω)− θ if ai∈I2 = W,,
u(b) if ai∈I2 = N.
(11)
This setting reflects that the government can confirm the employment status of welfare
claimers; however, it cannot confirm eligibility. Besley and Coate (1992) calls taking-up
welfare by the non-needy type players welfare fraud. The critical level of θ under the WB
institution is as follows:
θ̂WB = u(ω)− u(b), (12)







u(b) if ai∈I1 = T,
u(0) if ai∈I1 = NT,
(13)
Thus, since b is positive, all the needy-type players take up welfare.
The rich class has the following utility:
U3 = u(y − tWB), (14)
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where tWB is determined by the following government budget constraint:
(1− β)tWB = bm. (15)
Here, m is the total number of players who take up welfare benefits and
m = β[γ + (1− γ)(1− θ̂WB)]. (16)
Equilibrium outcomes are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In the equilibrium under WB, the following outcomes realize:




the utility of the needy type player is given by
U∗1,WB = u (b) ,
the utility of the non-needy type player with θ− is given by
U∗2,WB,W = u(ω)− θ,
the utility of the non-needy type player with θ+ is given by
U∗2,WB,N = u(b), (17)










From Proposition 1 and 2, the equilibrium outcomes in the welfare benefits system are
more complex than those in the basic income system. The reason is that players consider
the decision to take up (or not take up) welfare under the welfare benefits system.
5 Comparative institutional analysis
5.1 Social welfare comparison
This section provides a comparative institutional analysis of basic income and welfare bene-
fits. Following Atkinson et al. (1970), I define the social welfare function as follows:
SW = β [γu1(c1) + (1− γ)u2(c2)] + (1− β)u3(c3). (18)
The social welfare defined in (18) is the specific case of Atkinson et al. (1970). From Propo-
sition 1, social welfare under BI is given by:
SWBI = β
[
γu1(B) + (1− γ)
{
θ̂BIu2(ω +B) + (1− θ̂BI)u2(B)
}]
+ (1− β)u3(y − tBI). (19)
From Proposition 2, social welfare under WB is given by
SWWB = β
[
γu1(b) + (1− γ)
{
θ̂WBu2(ω) + (1− θ̂WB)u2(b)
}]
+ (1− β)u3(y − tWB). (20)
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show a comparison of social welfare under the BI and the WB with





Figures 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the numerical plots with low, middle, and high relative risk
aversion. By numerical plotting, we obtain the following result:
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Result 1 Social welfare under basic income is higher than welfare benefits when basic income
and welfare benefits are low. Social welfare under welfare benefits is higher than basic income,
otherwise.








Figure 1: Social welfare comparison with low relative risk aversion
Notes: The figure shows a numerical plot of social welfare. The solid line corresponds to SWBI, and the
dashed line corresponds to SWWB. The parameter setting: β = γ = 0.5, ω = 15, y = 100 and r = 0.6.








Figure 2: Social welfare comparison with middle relative risk aversion
Notes: The figure shows a numerical plot of social welfare. The solid line corresponds to SWBI, and the
dashed line corresponds to SWWB. The parameter setting: β = γ = 0.5, ω = 15, y = 100 and r = 1.1.
Although the shape of the curve by numerical plotting differs depending on the parameter
setting, there is a common tendency for social welfare to be large or small. When basic income
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Figure 3: Social welfare comparison with high relative risk aversion
Notes: The figure shows a numerical plot of social welfare. The solid line corresponds to SWBI, and the
dashed line corresponds to SWWB. The parameter setting: β = γ = 0.5, ω = 15, y = 100 and r = 1.5.
is low, basic income yields higher social welfare than welfare benefits, while welfare benefits
achieve higher social welfare than basic income. The implication is as follows: An increase
in basic income has a positive effect of improving the utility level for the poor class and a
negative effect of reducing that for the rich class. Meanwhile, an increase in welfare benefits
has a positive and negative effect, similar to basic income. However, basic income is provided
to all players, while welfare benefits are provided only to players who claim them. This
difference generates a different impact on each social welfare. That is, basic income will have
a more substantial negative effect as the institution becomes more tolerant of the poor.
5.2 Labor supply comparison




= βγ[u(ω +B)− u(B)], (22)
L∗
WB
= βγ[u(ω)− u(b)], (23)
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with the constant relative risk aversion
utility function (21).







Figure 4: Labor supply comparison
Notes: The figure shows the numerical plot of the equilibrium labor supply with respect to b. The solid line
corresponds to L∗
BI
, and the dashed line corresponds to L∗
WB
. The parameter setting: β = γ = 0.5, ω = 15,
y = 100, r = 0.5 and B = 10.
As shown in figure 4, the equilibrium labor supply under the welfare benefit system is
lower than that under the basic income system when the benefit level exceeds a critical level
b∗. b∗ is expressed as follows:.
b∗ = [ω1−r +B1−r − (ω +B)1−r]
1
1−r . (24)
The implication is very straightforward when the benefit level is lower than b∗, many players
choose to work because the incentive to take up welfare is weak, and when the benefits level
is larger than b∗, many players choose to take up welfare.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I present a comparative institutional analysis of basic income and welfare in
an economy with three types of players: the needy poor, the non-needy poor, and the rich.
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The contribution of this paper is to show that a basic income system can be either better or
worse than welfare benefits programs and that a higher level of basic income results in lower
social welfare than welfare benefits programs.
There is a problem of stigma in welfare benefits programs (Besley and Coate, 1992).
Stigma can reduce the incentive to take up welfare for eligible poor people, as shown in Kurita
et al. (2020) and Itaya and Kurita (2020)1. I will extend the model in this paper to contain
endogenous welfare stigma, welfare fraud, and incomplete take-up welfare as future work. It
is essential to consider institutions’ determination mechanisms in comparative institutional
analysis (Aoki, 2007). I will endogenize the determination of poverty-alleviating institutions
in the model in future research.
1It is called non-take-up welfare or incomplete take-up that eligible poor people do not claim to take up.
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